June 4, 2001, 8:30 a.m.

124. The Court spent some minutes verifying a document which demonstrated Capt. Lima Oliva’s departures and arrivals from Miami to Guatemala which established the Captain’s presence in Guatemala at the material time.  The Court then adjourned and the lawyers and judges involved went to the Guatemalan city of Antigua in order to hear a witness.  The public was not allowed to be present at the proceedings in Antigua.

125. This was an opportunity for me to meet with some of the international observers who had assembled to watch the closing arguments and the verdict.

126. Included were observers from Amnesty International, the San Francisco based human rights group Global Exchange, observers from NISGUA (Network in Solidarity with the people of Guatemala), representatives from EPICA (Ecumenical Program on Central American and the Caribbean) and others. In total there were probably about 30 – 50 international observers.

127. That day, after the early adjournment, I accompanied a group of observers to the San Sebastian Church and parish house and toured the crime scene.  We had lunch in the small café close to the church where Colonel Lima Estrada was seen the day of the Bishop’s murder.

128. The Court reconvened at 2:00 p.m. but immediately adjourned until the following morning.

129. That evening I scanned the Guatemalan television news for coverage of the trial.  On channel 7 there was a five-minute piece on the trial but it was at least 20 minutes into the news.  The coverage briefly showed the international observers who were in the courtroom.

June 5, 2001, 8:00 a.m.

130. The Court convened to hear the closing arguments of the prosecution.

131. The closing arguments started with the Public Ministry Fiscale Leopold Zeissig.  Zeissig gave an overview of the Prosecution’s case including a discussion of the political motives for the Bishop’s murder.

132. With regard to Father Mario Orantes, Zeissig pointed out that the testimony of Chanax Sontay indicated that Orantes had been seen sometime around 10:30 pm the night of the murder which would have been after the assassin had left the parish house.  Orantes did not call the authorities until midnight and had claimed that he was asleep in his room.  Orantes’s story was not consistent with the fact that the Parish house telephone had been continually ringing from sometime after the Bishop was supposed to have arrived back at the Parish house.  Luminol tests had also placed blood in Orantes’ bedroom and a psychiatric profile of Orantes had indicated that he was a very vulnerable person who was solely concerned with the “material aspects of life”.

133. With regard to Colonel Lima Estrada, Zeissig noted the evidence which placed the Colonel at a nearby store drinking beer during the material time of the murder. He then reviewed the evidence of Chanax Sontay that the Colonel had contracted him to watch Gerardi’s comings and goings. 

134. Zeissig reviewed the evidence of the taxi driver, Perussina, and noted that there was no doubt that a military licence plate was seen at the crime scene the night of the Bishop’s murder.  The plate was ultimately traced to a vehicle which had been auctioned by the army at the same time that the Colonel had been Commander of the base in which the vehicle was assigned.

135. With regard to the Captain Lima Oliva, Zeissig said that both the Captain and another military accused, AbdulioVillanueva, had arrived at the Parish house the night of the murder, around 10:30 pm in a black vehicle. Chanax Sontay testified that the Captain and Villanueva told him to help them rearrange the crime scene during which time Villanueva videotaped the scene.  (The video was never found).

136. With regard to Villanueva, his alibi was that he was still in jail at the relevant time. However, Villanueva’s cellmate testified that he had left on the day of the crime and that generally he was able to leave when he wanted to because of his position in the EMP. Also, Villanueva’s prison term (which he received because he killed an innocent milkman while conducting his duties as a Presidential Guard) had technically ended on the 24^th of April. There was no plausible explanation for him to remain in jail until the 28^th, the day of the murder.

137. Generally with regard to the EMP’s involvement in the crime, there were conflicting stories amongst the EMP witnesses with regard to when they had actually arrived at the crime scene after the authorities had been contacted.  Some EMP officials claimed that there was no one from the EMP at the crime scene while others had said that they had been sent to the crime scene to video the aftermath of the murder. 

138. In the end Zeissig asked for a sentence of thirty (30) years against the Colonel, the Captain, the military specialist Villanueva, and the Priest Orantes for the crime of “extra-judicial execution”.  It should be noted that the prosecution changed the charge against Orantes from the previous murder charge to extra-judicial execution at the time of the closing argument, a change which is now forming part of the basis for an appeal.  Against Margarita Lopez, the cook, the Public Ministry asked for a sentence of three years suggesting that she had somehow been involved in altering the crime scene after the act.

139. The Public Ministry also asked that the case remain open for investigation against certain individuals including Colonel Lima Oliva’s superior Lt. Col. Juan Francisco Escobar (an EMP photo specialist) and Major Andres Eduardo Villégran, EMP chief of services.

140. Following the closing arguments of the Fiscales of the Public Ministry, the Lawyers from ODHAG presented their closing arguments. ODHAG were involved in the case as what is known as a “querallante adhesivo” (as an intervenor).  Lawyer Mynor Melgar spoke on behalf of ODHAG.

141. Melgar began by describing the three (3) elements to prove the charge of extra judicial execution:

(i) the accused must have acted as an agent of the State;

(ii) the crime must have been politically motivated; and

(iii) there must be proof of the accused’s involvement in a plan to commit the crime.

142. Melgar mentioned the many eyewitnesses who saw a military presence around the San Sebastian Church both before, during and after the crime.  He noted that the crime was the result of an extensive amount of collaboration and required many resources to carry out.  The continual denial of a military presence by the military officials who testified was impossible to believe in light of the numerous eyewitness accounts.

143. As further evidence of state involvement, Melgar also noted an early offer made by the then President Arzu’s brother that in exchange for Orantes’ freedom, (he had been incarcerated at that point) the Church would deny military involvement.

144. Melgar noted that there were many indications that the EMP were involved, including the license plate that had been seen on one of the vehicles and the presence of EMP officials at the crime scene after the authorities had arrived, videotaping activity around the scene.  Of course there was also Chanax Sontay’s evidence which placed Captain Lima Oliva and Villanueva at the scene following the murder, re-arranging the crime scene. 

145. With regard to the political motive, Bishop Gerardi had a well-established commitment to the poor and vulnerable people of Guatemala.  Melgar noted that the motives for his killings could be seen in the work that the Bishop did while alive.

146. The Bishop had worked in the Quiché region during the civil war which was the scene of a number of massacres and atrocities perpetrated by the Guatemalan Army. The Bishop was exiled following his work in Quiché and the death of a number of Priests there. The then-President of Guatemala, Garcia, said that he would kill Gerardi if he returned to Guatemala, but Gerardi did return eventually and started to work on the Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI).

147. The Bishop had two prior attempts on his life and at one point was denied entry to Guatemala after he having travelled outside.  The Bishop had already been outspoken about the crimes against the Guatemalan people and thus the Army already had a political motive for the assassination prior to the publication of REMHI.  REMHI gave the Army an additional motive to see him as a political enemy. One might wonder why the Army would wait until after the publication of REMHI to conduct the assassination. This was because REMHI was only the first step in the process which would see the bringing to justice of those named in the report.  Of course REMHI included the name of Colonel Lima Estrada and it was unquestionable that death was going to be the only way to silence the Bishop. The idea that army officers could be judged for activities that occurred during the war was unthinkable to them in light of their own perception of themselves as heroes who were defending democracy.

148. Melgar noted the premeditation involved in the killing and that the evidence showed significant surveillance and extensive planning had taken place.  Margarita Lopez had testified that the Bishop was under constant surveillance by military intelligence.

149. Melgar also noted the testimony of Rodolfo Robles Espinoza, the Peruvian Army General who had been thrown out of Peru for denouncing political assassins within the Peruvian Army. Espinoza noted that the pattern involved in the Bishop’s assassination was consistent with the pattern used by many Latin American Armies in conducting political assassinations. Espinoza has also been the subject of death threats himself.

150. Melgar also reviewed the ultra conservative profile of the Lima family and noted that Captain Lima Oliva’s grandfather had been assassinated.  The Captain’s father, Colonel Lima Estrada was obsessed with containing the spread of communism and felt that war was the only means of stopping a perceived communist insurgency.  The description of Colonel Lima Estrada as an ultra conservative came from recent declassified U.S. documents which listed Colonel Lima Estrada as a military officer who had the potential of putting the democratic process at risk.

151. With regard to Villanueva there was an incident when acting as a Presidential Guard in which he had killed an innocent milkman under mysterious circumstances which ODHAG had then investigated. Villanueva thus had a personal motive for being involved in the crime in order to exact revenge against ODHAG.

152. Melgar went on to deal with the evidence against Orantes.  ODHAG pointed out that Orantes had the keys to San Sebastian, knew the Bishop’s movements, and that his psychiatric profile revealed that he had serious personal problems and was a vulnerable personality.  There was no doubt that he was awake when Gerardi died as his last internet log entry showed that he was still awake at 10:08 p.m.  It was very hard to believe that he didn’t hear the phone or other noises and his claim that a light woke him up was difficult to believe. ODHAG noted that the reasons for Orantes’ involvement remained a mystery but that his involvement could not be doubted.

153. With regard to Margarita Lopez, the cook, ODHAG had profound doubts about her involvement in the assassination and argued for her release.

154. Throughout the closing arguments of both the Public Ministry and ODHAG, the Prosecutors repeated that the legal test of “authorship” involved the Court coming to a logical conclusion of involvement.  It was not necessary to show conclusively that the accused actually committed the crime.

155. ODHAG also called for the investigation to remain open into a number of individuals including those that the Fiscales had mentioned and a long list of others.